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Abstract. What role do sentiment investors play in the pricing of newly listed
stocks? We derive conditions under which we can distinguish between sentiment and
rational pricing behavior and test for the rationality of small investors’ demand for new
stock issues using data from pre-issue (or ‘grey’) markets in Europe. Under sentiment,
the model predicts asymmetric relations between the prices at which small investors
trade new stock issues in the grey market and i) the subsequent issue price set by the
investment bank, ii) prices in the early after-market, and iii) the degree of stock price
reversal in the long run. Our empirical results suggest that sentiment demand is present
and influences the pricing of newly listed firms.
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1. Introduction
Behavioral biases such as ‘conservatism’ or ‘over-confidence’ have become popular explanations
for a variety of asset pricing phenomena that are hard to reconcile with a rational decision-
making framework.1 However, the extent to which ‘sentiment’ (as opposed to rational) investor
demand can account for these phenomena in equilibrium is controversial, not least given the
difficulty in identifying empirically the demand curves and information processing of different
investor groups. Our aim in this paper is to study the role (if any) of sentiment investors in
the pricing of newly listed stocks, using a unique dataset that helps identify the valuations
and informational updating among small investors.
The market for newly listed firms is a good setting in which to study the effect of sentiment
investors on stock prices. Such firms by definition have no prior share price history and tend
to be young, immature, and relatively informationally opaque. Not surprisingly, therefore,
they are hard to value, and it seems reasonable to assume that investors will have a wide
range of priors about their market values. Miller (1977) points out that this heterogeneity
(coupled with short sale constraints) can lead to predictable patterns, such as poor returns
in the long run. Similarly, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that overenthusiasm among retail
investors may explain the much documented price jumps once trading in newly listed stocks
begins, as well as the subsequent low returns over the first few years of trading.
A major difficulty in testing such behavioral conjectures is disentangling the expectations
of different types of investors when we observe only a single, market-clearing price. In this
paper, we take advantage of a quirk in the trading environment of many European countries to
isolate the pre-issue valuations of a group of predominantly small (largely retail) investors and
link these to post-issue prices both in the short run and the long run. We are able to do this
because many European countries have pre-issue (or ‘grey’) markets in which investors can
speculate on the future stock prices of companies that are in the process of going public. Grey
markets operate in parallel with institutional bookbuilding but are organized by unaffiliated
brokers.2 While grey market trading is widespread in Europe, regulations in the U.S. prohibit
investors from trading IPOs before they are listed on an exchange. There is, however, a very
active when-issued market for Treasury securities.
1See Shleifer (2000) for a survey of investor sentiment and its theoretical underpinnings. See Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) for models of investor sentiment.
2Section 4 describes grey markets in more detail.
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Grey market prices are a matter of public record. They provide us a unique opportunity
to observe the opinions of an important subset of mostly small (typically retail) investors.
This allows us to examine the effect such investors have on i) the issue price the investment
bank sets at the end of bookbuilding, ii) the prices at which newly listed companies trade in
the aftermarket, and iii) the degree of stock price reversal in the long run.
Rather than simply describing these relations empirically, we impose some economic struc-
ture on the data. Our aim in doing so is to derive conditions under which we can distinguish
between sentiment and rational trading behavior and thus test for the rationality of small
investors’ demand for new stock issues. In the model, small investors trade in the grey mar-
ket, while the underwriter collects bids from large institutional investors during bookbuilding
before pricing the issue.3 Thus, there are two separate markets with two separate sets of
investors. Bookbuilding investors are endowed with information about the fundamental value
of the shares. Grey market investors also have information which may or may not be relevant
to the fundamental value. In addition, grey market investors may overweight the relevance of
their information (which is analogous to ‘overconfidence’ as in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998) or ‘conservatism’ as in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)). Note that
we allow for the possibility that grey market investors are sentiment investors, but we do not
impose it.
To the extent that grey market investors are representative of small investors in general,
their valuation is indicative of small investors’ reservation price in the aftermarket. If that
reservation price exceeds the fundamental value of the shares, bookbuilding investors can sell
their shares in the immediate aftermarket at a price above the fundamental value. If instead
small investors’ reservation price is low, bookbuilding investors will hold on to the shares that
they are allocated, valuing them at the fundamental value. As a result, bookbuilding investors
value the shares at the maximum of the fundamental value and small investors’ reservation
price.
In this setting, the empirical relations that we expect between the grey market price and
both the issue price and the aftermarket price depend on the degree to which the grey market
price contains information about the fundamental value, and also on the possibility that grey
market investors tend to overweight the relevance of their information.
3For a description of bookbuilding see Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002).
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Consider the extreme case in which the grey market information is completely unrelated
to the fundamental value, but grey market investors mistakenly use it in computing their
reservation price. In this case, we expect a positive relation between the grey market price and
the aftermarket price only when the reservation price is above the fundamental value. When
the reservation price is below the fundamental value there should be no relation, because
bookbuilding investors will not sell their shares to grey market investors.
The underwriter also observes the grey market price. When the grey market price is high,
he will anticipate that the shares will be sold in the aftermarket and will set a higher offer
price to extract the bookbuilding investors’ trading surplus. When the grey market price is
low, the underwriter will disregard the valuation of small investors when pricing the shares.
Thus, to the extent that the underwriter anticipates a high reservation price, there will be a
similar asymmetric relation between the grey market price and the issue price.
Next consider the case where the grey market price does contain fundamental information.
Now there will be a positive relation between the grey market price and both the issue price
and the aftermarket price even when the grey market price is low. However, to the extent
that grey market investors overweight their information, there will still be an asymmetry.
When the grey market price is high the aftermarket price will be very close to the grey market
price, but when the grey market price is low the aftermarket price will only incorporate the
component of the grey market price that is related to fundamentals.4
Note that the model predicts an asymmetric relation between these prices only if grey
market investors are sentiment investors. Without sentiment their reservation price will always
equal the expected fundamental value. In such case, the relation will depend on the presence
of fundamental information in the grey market price regardless of whether the grey market
price is high or low, i.e., there will be no asymmetry. Thus, whether or not grey market
investors are sentiment investors and overweight their information is an empirical question
which can be answered empirically in the context of our model.5
4Note that prices are sometimes biased upwards, but never downwards, even though the potentially irra-
tional investors could be either excessively optimistic or pessimistic. In the presence of short sale constraints,
excessively pessimistic investors are priced out of the market.
5Similar predictions would arise if grey market investors are less informed than bookbuilding investors,
but do not fully update when they observe the aftermarket price. This form of irrational behavior is closely
related to the one in the model except that the conservatism occurs when trading begins in the aftermarket,
rather than before.
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We test the predictions of the model using grey market price data for a large set of
European IPOs completed between 1995 and 2002. We find that the grey market price is
more correlated with the issue price and the aftermarket price when the grey market price is
high, although there is a positive correlation even when the grey market price is low. This
suggests that the grey market price contains information about the fundamental value, but
also that grey market investors overweight their information in a way that is reflected in the
aftermarket price and exploited by the underwriter when setting the issue price. We also find
higher levels of aftermarket trading volume when the grey market price is high, consistent
with bookbuilding investors selling their shares to grey market investors only when the grey
market investors have higher valuations. In other words, our empirical findings support the
view that sentiment investors can drive up prices in the short-run aftermarket.
The model also has empirical implications for long-run returns. Recall that when the grey
market price is high, demand from sentiment investors will cause the shares to trade at a
high price relative to fundamentals in the short run. In the long run, prices will revert to the
fundamental value, as the true value is revealed through time, and we expect negative returns.
On the other hand, when the grey market price is low, the aftermarket price is always based
on fundamentals and we do not expect a reversal pattern. Our empirical results are consistent
with this prediction.
We should point out one thing this paper does not do. Although the optimal mechanism
in our model involves allocating underpriced shares to facilitate information extraction in
bookbuilding (as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989)), it is not our goal to explain the magnitude
of observed underpricing. Our aim is instead to show how high valuations among grey market
investors can lead to a high aftermarket price, not why the issue price is often set well below
this. A number of explanations given in the literature (for example, agency conflicts) could
be added to our model to explain underpricing.
We stress that our results are also relevant for countries that do not have a grey market
(such as the United States). As long as some investors are motivated by sentiment and the
underwriter and the major institutional investors have some sense of what these investors are
willing to pay, sentiment investors will drive short-run prices upwards when they are overly
optimistic. The significance of the grey market is that it allows us to observe small investors’
valuations easily and directly, enabling us to test for these effects.
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Related literature
Recent literature investigating the role of sentiment in explaining asset pricing patterns in-
cludes Neal and Wheatley (1998) and Baker and Wurgler (2003). While this literature consid-
ers sentiment as a market-wide phenomenon, the grey market enables us to proxy for investor
sentiment with respect to individual stocks.
Several papers on IPOs have documented empirical patterns that also motivate our study.
Ritter (1991) presents evidence that abnormally high prices immediately after the IPO are
followed by abnormally low returns in the long-run, and Ritter and Welch (2002) show that
this pattern is particularly strong during ‘hot market’ periods.
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) compare IPO offer prices to ‘fair values’ computed
using various price multiples of non-IPO industry peers. They find that issues which are
overpriced relative to fair value also have higher returns on the first day of trading but lower
returns in the long run. These patterns are consistent with our results. If some investors
are excessively enthusiastic about an issue, the underwriter sets the offer price above the
fundamental value, expecting these investors to buy the shares in the aftermarket. This leads
to a high short-run price and negative long-run drift as the price converges to the fundamental
value.
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) find that a high level of ‘flipping’ predicts low returns
in the long run. In the context of our paper, flipping can be interpreted as bookbuilding
investors selling their shares to grey market investors, which is when we also find low long-run
returns.
A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, has attributed these IPO patterns to
the presence of sentiment investors. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) show that the annual
number of IPOs is negatively related to the closed-end fund discount which they argue is a
measure of retail investor sentiment. Rajan and Servaes (2003) model two different types of
irrational agents, feedback traders and sentiment investors. The latter are similar to our grey
market investors. They proxy for investor sentiment using the market-to-book ratio and find
that it correlates positively with first-day returns and negatively with long-run returns. In
contrast, we use the grey market price to measure the valuation of sentiment investors.
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2003) argue that an initial price run-up may be due to
the existence of ‘exuberant’ investors and may lead to long-term underperformance. Their
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model has similarities with ours, but focuses on explaining underpricing, which is needed to
compensate regular investors for losses in case the ‘hot’ market ends prematurely.
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) relate the aftermarket price path to momentum
traders, and focus on the role of research analysts and the media in creating momentum. They
find that ‘extra hot’ issues tend to have low long-run returns.
Testing behavioral theories requires investigating the role of retail or small investors. While
we use the grey market price as an indication of small investors’ valuation, other studies have
instead looked at who owns the shares in the aftermarket. Ofek and Richardson (2003) show
that high initial returns occur when institutions sell IPO shares to retail investors on the
first day. Similarly, Ben Dor (2003) looks at the level of institutional ownership shortly after
the IPO and finds that high institutional ownership forecasts higher returns in ‘hot’ markets.
These findings are consistent with our paper, since we predict that bookbuilding investors sell
their shares to small investors when they are overvalued. Derrien (2004) develops a model
where retail investors bid for shares in the bookbuilding process in the expectation that they
can sell them at a higher price in the aftermarket. In a sample of French IPOs, he finds that
retail investors’ bookbuilding demand correlates positively with the issue price and initial
returns, and negatively with long-run performance. These results are consistent with our
findings. In addition, through the grey market we have the unique opportunity to observe the
valuation of the investors who will be buying shares in the aftermarket, rather than just the
investors who will be selling shares obtained in bookbuilding. In other words, we can measure
the expectations of sentiment investors directly.
In an empirical study that is complementary to our findings, Dorn (2003) finds that the
volume of grey market trading among the customers of a German retail brokerage is correlated
with high initial returns and low long-run returns. This can be viewed as further evidence
that participation by small investors in the grey market can be interpreted as sentiment.
Besides Dorn (2003), two other papers study Germany’s grey market. Lo¨ﬄer, Panther, and
Theissen (2002) document that grey market prices are unbiased estimates of first-day prices.
Aussenegg, Pichler, and Stomper (2003) also find that IPO issue prices are related to grey
market prices. However, the estimated coefficient in their model is less than one, which they
argue is consistent with bookbuilding being used for gathering information before the initial
price range is set (consistent with the model of Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2003)).
Finally, Pichler and Stomper (2004) model the interaction between bookbuilding and the
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grey market when grey market investors have similar information to bookbuilding investors.
They ask whether the existence of a grey market helps or hinders information aggregation in
bookbuilding. In contrast, we introduce a class of investors who have (potentially) different
information from bookbuilding investors, in order to explain certain IPO phenomena and to
show how these (possibly biased) investors affect prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and derive the optimal
mechanism. We discuss the empirical implications in Section 3. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. In Section 6 we extend the model to allow
bookbuilding investors to trade in the grey market. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
An issuer wishes to sell S shares in an IPO. Each share has a fundamental value v ∈ [0, v¯]. Since
the underwriter does not know v before setting the issue price PI , he conducts bookbuilding
to collect information from institutional investors about v. Simultaneous with bookbuilding,
a publicly observable grey market takes place in which a different group of investors trade the
shares on a when-issued basis.6
The expected fundamental value of a share is a weighted average of the information arriving
from bookbuilding sB and the information from the grey market sG:
E(v | sB, sG) = αsG + (1− α)sB, (1)
where 0 ≤ α < 1. In the extreme case of α = 0, grey market investors’ information is irrelevant.
We assume that bookbuilding investors’ information is always relevant.7
The timing is as follows. First the underwriter sets an initial indicative price range, based
on his prior beliefs. Then both bookbuilding and grey market trading begin. At the end
of bookbuilding, the underwriter observes the bids in the book as well as the grey market
price and sets the issue price. When the issue price is set, information about bookbuilding is
revealed. Afterwards, aftermarket trading begins.
6Conversations with grey market brokers confirm that grey market investors are primarily smaller institu-
tions and retail investors. However, in Section 6 we consider the case in which there is an overlap between
grey market and bookbuilding investors.
7Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) show that bookbuilding aggregates information that is relevant for both the
issue price and the long-run aftermarket price.
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2.1. Bookbuilding. We model the bookbuilding process as in Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet
(2002). Three investors take part in the bookbuilding process: two are informed and one is
uninformed. The uninformed investor can buy at most S(1 − k) shares, with 0 < k < 1.
The information from bookbuilding, sB, is the aggregate of the signals si observed by the
two informed investors, i = 1, 2. si is i.i.d. and equals H with probability pi and L with
probability (1 − pi). The distribution of the signals is such that if both investors observe a
signal equal to H then sB = H; if both observe L then sB = L; but if one observes L and
the other H then sB = M , where 0 < L < M < H < v¯. The ex-ante expected value of the
bookbuilding information is E(sB) = pi
2H+2pi(1−pi)M+(1−pi)2L. For simplicity, we assume
that E(sB) = M .
From the point of view of an informed investor who observes si (as well as the grey market
information sG, which, as explained below, can be inferred from the grey market price) the
expected fundamental value is
E(v | sG, si) = αsG + (1− α)E(sB | si) (2)
Each informed investor submits a bid for shares, after observing his own signal, but not
knowing the signal of the other informed investor. The underwriter designs a mechanism
(described in Section 2.4) in which he sets the issue price and allocates the shares as a function
of the bids. We assume that the underwriter acts in the issuer’s interest, i.e., he maximizes
IPO proceeds.
The bookbuilding set-up described so far is similar to the one in Benveniste and Spindt
(1989). The main difference here is the existence of a grey market whose price is observed
before the issue price is set.
2.2. Grey market. At the same time as bookbuilding there is a grey market in which in-
vestors trade the shares on a when-issued basis. For now, we assume that bookbuilding
investors are not allowed to trade in the grey market.
Since in reality the grey market price is continuously and publicly observable, while book-
building is a confidential process controlled by the underwriter, we assume that grey market
investors do not observe sB. Instead, they only observe a signal about the value of the shares,
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sG ∈ [0, v¯].8
Grey market investors know that the fundamental value is a weighted average of their
signal and the bookbuilding information, but we allow for the possibility that they overweight
the importance of their signal. In other words, after observing sG, their expectation of the
fundamental value of the shares is
EG(v | sG) = αˆsG + (1− αˆ)E(sB) (3)
where αˆ ≥ α and EG refers to the expectation from the perspective of grey market investors.
The difference (αˆ− α) represents the extent to which grey market investors overweight their
signal. If αˆ − α > 0 they are sentiment investors, while if αˆ − α = 0 they are fully rational.
Note that only the expectation of sB appears in equation (3), since grey market investors do
not observe the bookbuilding information.
Trading in the grey market results in a price PGM , reflecting investors’ beliefs about the
fundamental value of the shares. Thus, PGM = EG(v | sG). After observing PGM the under-
writer and the bookbuilding investors, knowing αˆ, can perfectly infer sG using the following
relation:
sG =
PGM − (1− αˆ)M
αˆ
(4)
After the underwriter aggregates the bookbuilding information into the issue price (and
before the start of aftermarket trading), the bookbuilding information sB is revealed.
9 Grey
market investors then update their valuation, starting from their prior valuation, to
PˆGM ≡ PˆGM(sG, sB) = αˆsG + (1− αˆ)sB = PGM + (1− αˆ)(sB −M). (5)
PˆGM differs from PGM because it incorporates the observed sB rather than its expectation.
It differs from the fundamental value if αˆ 6= α. The difference between αˆ and α captures the
extent to which grey market investors’ expectations are biased (and thus they are sentiment
8The assumption that the signal of the grey market investors is continuous, while the signal of the book-
building investors is discrete, is made only in order to simplify the analysis.
9A more realistic assumption might be that grey market investors infer the information from the issue
price. However, we assume sB is revealed to avoid modelling situations in which the issue price is manipulated
by the underwriter to hide information.
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investors). This bias is supported by experimental evidence that individuals are slow to change
their beliefs in the face of new evidence: they update their priors too little relative to Bayesian
updating (see Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).10
2.3. Aftermarket. After the shares are allocated to the bookbuilding investors, trading in
the aftermarket begins. At this point, both bookbuilding and grey market investors have
observed both sG and sB. Grey market investors value the shares at PˆGM , while bookbuilding
investors value the shares at the expected fundamental value, given in equation (1). Again,
these two valuations differ if αˆ > α.
We assume that aftermarket participants include investors who have the same valuation
as the grey market investors. They may be the grey market investors themselves or other
(perhaps retail) investors who did not trade in the grey market. As a result, the grey market
price is representative of the valuation of a larger set of investors. For simplicity, we continue
to refer to this set of investors as grey market investors.11
Let PAM denote the aftermarket price in the short-run. If the fundamental value of the
shares exceeds the price grey market investors are willing to pay in the aftermarket, then
the bookbuilding investors will not sell their shares to them. Thus, there will be no trading
involving grey market investors and the aftermarket price will not depend on their valuation.
The expected aftermarket price PAM will then equal the expected fundamental value. If
instead the price that grey market investors are willing to pay exceeds the fundamental value,
the bookbuilding investors can sell their shares to the grey market investors at this higher
price.
The price at which bookbuilding investors can sell their shares depends upon the depth of
the market. If there are many investors willing to buy shares at the price PˆGM , bookbuilding
investors will have all the market power and will set the price equal to PˆGM , extracting all the
surplus from trading. However, if there are not enough investors willing to buy all S shares
at PˆGM , for example if the demand for these shares is downward sloping, then bookbuilding
investors will have to sell some of their shares at a lower price. Assuming a linear demand
10An alternative explanation could be the one studied in Harris and Raviv (1993), where individuals receiving
common information differ in the way they interpret this information.
11Dorn (2003) finds a strong positive correlation between the volume of retail trade in the grey market and
retail volume in the first-day of aftermarket trade. This supports our assumption that the opinion of grey
market investors is indicative of the valuation of small investors in the aftermarket.
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curve, bookbuilding investors expect to sell their shares in the aftermarket at PˆGM−λS, where
λS captures the discount necessary to sell all S in the aftermarket. Although more complex
functional forms are possible, this simple linear form suffices to capture the idea that the
market may not be very deep. If the market is deep enough to sell all the shares at PˆGM , then
λ = 0.
In the long run, all uncertainty is resolved and the long-run price equals the fundamental
value.
2.4. Optimal mechanism. We now characterize the optimal bookbuilding mechanism. This
mechanism specifies the issue price and the number of shares to be allocated to the various
bidders, as a function of their bids and the grey market price PGM .
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To find the optimal mechanism, by the Revelation Principle we can restrict attention,
without loss of generality, to a direct revelation mechanism where bookbuilding investors
simultaneously announce their signals to the underwriter. The underwriter uses the announced
signals (s˜1, s˜2) (which aggregate to s˜B) and the grey market information sG to set the issue
price and to allocate the shares. A direct revelation mechanism is described by the outcome
functions (PI , q, qu), where PI(sG, s˜B) is the issue price; q(sG, s˜i, s˜j) is the allocation to an
informed investor who announces signal s˜i when the other informed investor announces s˜j;
and qu(sG, s˜i, s˜j) is the allocation to the uninformed investor when one informed investor
announces s˜i and the other announces s˜j. We look for an equilibrium of this mechanism in
which buyers truthfully reveal their signals.
In order to derive the optimal mechanism, we must first determine the reservation price of
the bookbuilding investors. After the issue price has been set, bookbuilding investors observe
both sB and sG. They thus know the expected fundamental value of the shares (equation
(1)), which is the value they will obtain if they hold the shares in the long run. Additionally,
since they observe PGM , they can also compute the price that grey market investors would be
willing to pay in the aftermarket (PˆGM − λS).
When PˆGM−λS exceeds the fundamental value, bookbuilding investors can sell their shares
in the aftermarket to grey market investors, at a profit. Thus, the relevant value of the shares,
12By law, the underwriter cannot charge different prices to different investors, so we do not allow the
mechanism to price discriminate among investors. Bennouri and Falconieri (2003) show that, if there is no
limit to the quantities investors can be allocated, price discrimination is never optimal.
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from their point of view, is the short-run aftermarket price. When PˆGM−λS is lower than the
fundamental value, bookbuilding investors will not sell shares in the aftermarket. Therefore,
after the end of bookbuilding, when a bookbuilding investor observes sB, his valuation will be
the maximum of the two possible valuations, i.e., Max{E(v | sG, sB), PˆGM − λS}.
During bookbuilding, each informed investor will have observed his own signal si but not
that of the other informed investor. Therefore, an investor with a signal si = H will value a
share at pi ∗Max{E(v | sG, H), PˆGM − λS} + (1 − pi) ∗Max{E(v | sG,M), PˆGM − λS}. An
investor with a signal L will have a valuation of pi ∗Max{E(v | sG,M), PˆGM −λS}+(1−pi)∗
Max{E(v | sG, L), PˆGM − λS}.
The underwriter, who also observes the grey market price, knows that if PGM is high,
he can increase the issue price above the fundamental value. That way, he can extract the
surplus informed investors expect to gain from trading with the grey market investors in the
aftermarket. Yet if PGM is low, the underwriter does not need to lower the issue price, since
he knows that the bookbuilding investors are still willing to buy and hold the shares at a price
close to the fundamental value. In other words, the issue price (and the subsequent aftermarket
price) will reflect the grey market price when it is high, but will reflect the fundamental value
when the grey market price is low.
The following proposition presents the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 1: Assume that αˆ ≥ 1−α
2
and that H and L are equidistant from M .13 In
the optimal mechanism the quantities allocated to the bookbuilding investors are:
q(H,H) = S/2, qu(H,H) = 0,
q(H,L) = S, q(L,H) = 0, qu(H,L) = 0,
q(L,L) = Sk/2, qu(L,L) = S(1− k)
(6)
where we have suppressed the argument sG since the quantities allocated do not depend on the
grey market information.
13These assumptions are sufficient but by no means necessary for Proposition 1 to hold.
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The issue price depends on the grey market and the bookbuilding information as follows:
PI(sG, H) = VH(H)− 1−pipi k [VM(L)− VL(L)]
PI(sG,M) = VM(M)
PI(sG, L) = VL(L)
(7)
where
VsB(s˜B) ≡Max{E(v | sG, sB), PˆGM(sG, s˜B)− λS}. (8)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
VsB(s˜B) represents the value of a share to an informed investor where sB is the aggregate
information from the two signals of the informed investors and s˜B is the aggregate information
revealed through bookbuilding (and thus conveyed to grey market investors). When sB 6= s˜B,
at least one investor misreported his signal. VsB(s˜B) is the maximum of the fundamental value
and the sale value. Note that our notation suppresses the argument PGM in the function VsB
as the maximization is conducted for a given PGM .
Although the quantities allocated do not depend on the grey market price, the issue price
PI depends on PGM as well as on the announced signals. To highlight how the issue price, as
expressed in (7), depends on the grey market price and the information in the book, we can
divide the possible values of PGM into intervals and present the issue price for each interval.
The boundaries of the intervals and the actual expression for the issue price in each interval
are derived in Appendix 1 and represented in Figure 1.
The vertical axis represents the possible values that PGM can take. The expression for PI
is different in each interval. Moreover, within each interval, the issue price depends on the
bookbuilding information, sB. Figure 1 displays the asymmetry in the optimal mechanism.
Let us start by looking at the two extreme intervals. When PGM is very high (i.e., above v1,
where v1 is defined in Appendix 1) the issue price is close to the grey market price (more
precisely, the updated valuation of the grey market investors) and does not depend at all
on the bookbuilding information. This follows because the grey market price is so high that
bookbuilding investors are certain they can sell their shares in the aftermarket for more than
13
the fundamental value, regardless of what the fundamental value is. The underwriter takes
advantage of this by setting PI above the fundamental value. When PGM is very low (below
v4), PI is based solely on the fundamentals. This is because the grey market valuation is
so low that grey market investors are unwilling to buy shares in the aftermarket at a price
above the fundamental value. In this case, the grey market is irrelevant and the mechanism
is the standard bookbuilding mechanism. In the middle are cases in which the issue price is
set equal to the fundamental value (minus an informational rent to be left to bookbuilding
investors for revealing their information truthfully) when the fundamental value is high, and
equal to the updated grey market valuation otherwise. So, on average, PI is close to PGM
when PGM is high, but not when PGM is low, creating an asymmetry in the relation between
the issue price and the grey market price.
2.5. Discussion. Central to the arguments presented in this paper and formalized in the
model is the presence of an asymmetric relation between the grey market price and the issue
and aftermarket prices. The extent of the asymmetry depends on the weights α and αˆ. When
(αˆ − α) is small, grey market investors overweight their signal only by a small amount. In
this case, their valuation and the fundamental value will be similar and there will be less
asymmetry. When (αˆ−α) is large, grey market investors are much more overconfident in the
relevance of their signal and their valuation can be much higher than the fundamental value.
In this case, the issuer can take advantage of their overconfidence and set the issue price much
higher than the fundamental value.
Recall that α indicates the relevance of the grey market signal for the fundamental value.
In the extreme case of α = 0, the grey market price is not relevant for the fundamental value,
which is completely determined by the bookbuilding information. In this case, when PGM is
low and the issue price is set equal to the fundamental value, there will be no relation between
PGM and the issue price. However, when the grey market price is high, it will be closely
related to the issue price even though it contains no fundamental information.
On the other hand, when α > 0 the grey market price does include fundamental informa-
tion. In this case, there will be a positive relation between PGM and the issue price even when
the grey market price is low. However, to the extent that αˆ > α, this relation will be weaker
than when PGM is high, so the asymmetry remains.
The issue price is based on the valuation of bookbuilding investors, which in turn depends
14
on their expectation about aftermarket prices. Thus the asymmetry in the issue price is driven
by the asymmetry in the aftermarket price PAM , and there will be a stronger relation between
PGM and PAM when PGM is high.
Although we allow for shares to be sold in the aftermarket at a discount λS to capture
a potential lack of depth, the results also hold when λ = 0. A larger λ implies that shares
will be sold to grey market investors in the aftermarket less often, but the basic asymmetry
remains.
As explained above, the bookbuilding investors’ expectations about the aftermarket are
central to determining their willingness to pay and the choice of issue price. This aspect is
similar in spirit to Busaba and Chang’s (2002) model where investors have an incentive to
misreport their information to the underwriter in order to fool uninformed investors and take
advantage of them in the aftermarket. However, there are two main differences here. First,
in our model the underwriter designs the optimal mechanism to account for bookbuilding
investors’ incentives to sell their shares. As a result, bookbuilding investors will not misreport
their information. Second, since the grey market price signals the potential sale value in the
aftermarket, the bookbuilding investors and the underwriter can take it into account when
determining their actions.
This is why the existence of the grey market is beneficial to the issuer even when it does
not contain any information about the fundamental value of the shares (α = 0). The valuation
of the grey market investors affects the bookbuilding investors’ valuation (because it affects
the short-run aftermarket price) and thus provides a lower bound on their willingness to pay.
If grey market investors are willing to pay a high price, the surplus that can be appropriated
increases. Moreover, since this part of the valuation is publicly observable, the issuer can
extract a larger part of the trading surplus from the bookbuilding investors.
3. Empirical implications
The model allows us to make predictions about the relation between the grey market price
PGM , the issue price PI , and the aftermarket prices in the short and long run, as well as other
variables. Here we list the main empirical predictions. A more detailed analysis is conducted
in Section 5, where we present the results.
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Hypothesis 1: PI is positively correlated with PGM . Moreover, αˆ > α implies that this
correlation is larger when PGM is high. α > 0 implies that this correlation is positive even
when PGM is low.
Hypothesis 2: The short-run aftermarket price PAM is positively correlated with PGM .
Moreover, αˆ > α implies that this correlation is larger when PGM is high. α > 0 implies that
this correlation is positive even when PGM is low.
Hypothesis 3: When the reliability of the grey market signal sG increases, the correlations
of PGM with PI and PAM increase.
A more reliable grey market signal sG means that an investor should give additional weight
to sG. In other words, α should be higher. Thus, PGM will be more closely related to the
fundamental value. While the model does not necessarily imply it, presumably αˆ will also be
higher in this case.
Hypothesis 4: When PGM is high, PI and PAM are negatively correlated with the issue size
(S) and positively correlated with the depth of the grey market (−λ).
Hypothesis 5: Aftermarket trading volume is higher when PGM is high than when PGM is
low, since when PGM is high bookbuilding investors sell their shares to grey market investors
in the aftermarket.
Finally, the model has implications for long-run returns. Intuitively, when PGM exceeds
the fundamental value, the immediate aftermarket price (PAM) is closely related to the grey
market investors’ willingness to pay (PˆGM), which differs from the fundamental value if grey
market investors overweight their own signal, i.e., if αˆ > α. In this case, we expect reversal
of the share price towards the fundamental value in the long run. In contrast, the difference
between PAM and PGM captures grey market investors updating their valuation when they
learn the bookbuilding information sB. To the extent that they underweight the bookbuilding
information, the share price movement from PGM to PAM is only a partial movement in the
right direction and should continue in the same direction as the fundamental value is revealed
over time. This discussion is summarized as:
Hypothesis 6: When PGM is high, the long-run return (relative to PAM) is negatively
correlated with PGM and positively correlated with the difference between PAM and PGM (to
the extent that grey market investors do not fully update for sB, i.e., if αˆ > α).
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The correlations predicted in Hypothesis 6 can be derived more formally from the model as
follows. The share price converges in the long run to the fundamental value αsB + (1− α)sG.
Recall that when PGM is high, the short-run aftermarket price is PAM = PˆGM − λS = αˆsB +
(1− αˆ)sG − λS (i.e., the reservation price of the grey market investors). Thus the difference
between the long-run price and the short-run price is (αˆ − α)(sB − sG) + λS. This is the
long-run return in dollars. To the extent that αˆ > α, this return is positively related to the
bookbuilding signal sB and negatively related to the grey market signal sG. If αˆ = α, the
short-run aftermarket price is already the expected fundamental value, so the long-run returns
are zero.
The difference between PAM and PGM (for high PGM) is (1− αˆ)(sB −E(sB))− λS, which
is also positively related to the bookbuilding signal. Thus, there is a positive relation between
the long-run return and (PAM − PGM) if and only if αˆ > α.
Finally, PGM equals αˆsG+(1− αˆ)E(sB) and so it is also related to the grey market signal
sG. Thus, the long-run return should be negatively related to PGM as long as αˆ > α.
4. Sample and data
The dataset consists of 486 companies which went public in twelve European countries between
November 1995 and December 2002 and for which we have grey market prices. The extent to
which IPO shares are traded in grey markets varies from country to country. For instance, in
Germany and Italy most IPOs trade in the grey market while in France or Sweden very few
do. (As we will see, outside Germany and Italy, grey market trading is more likely in larger
IPOs.) As a result, our dataset is a subset of the universe of 2,723 firms going public in the
twelve countries over the sample period.
While we only consider firms that go public in Europe, our sample does include some
non-European companies that obtained a first-time listing in a European country (typically
Germany’s Neuer Markt). Sample companies thus come from a total of 20 countries: Austria
(13), Belgium (1), Canada (1), Denmark (1), Finland (3), France (13), Germany (321), Greece
(2), Ireland (2), Israel (7), Italy (61), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (11),
Norway (2), Spain (5), Sweden (2), Switzerland (11), the United Kingdom (24), and the
United States (4).
Grey markets are usually organized not by an exchange but by independent brokers who
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make forward markets in IPO shares on a when-issued basis. Thus, the structure of grey
markets differs across countries and even within countries depending on the broker. Brokers
quote spreads and investors can take a long or short position depending on their expectations.
Usually, grey market prices are public information: not only are they available from the broker,
but they are often reported in the financial news media.
Grey market trading typically begins on the day the company publishes its initial indicative
price range and concludes on the day before the stock begins trading on the stock market.
Often, IPOs are priced a day or two before stock market trading begins, in which case grey
market trading continues for a short while after the IPO has been priced.
Grey market prices were obtained from two large brokers, based in Germany and the
United Kingdom, and supplemented with a news search. For every company in our sample,
we have the last grey market price established before the IPO is priced, and for 262 companies
we also have post-pricing grey market prices.14
Information on the IPOs is derived from an updated version of the dataset compiled
by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), based on Dealogic’s Equityware, Thomson Financial’s
SDC, information from national exchanges, and a comprehensive news search. Firm and offer
characteristics are taken from the IPO prospectuses. Aftermarket trading prices and trading
volumes are from Datastream. We convert monetary values – such as gross proceeds – into
U.S. dollars using exchange rates on the first day of trading.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole as well as broken down by the
twelve countries on whose exchanges sample companies list. Most sample firms (75 percent)
list in Germany, 54 companies list in more than one country (usually the home country plus
Frankfurt or London), and 43 companies do not list in their home country at all (including
non-European issuers from Israel, the U.S., and Eastern Europe).
Although the sample IPOs span the period from November 1995 to December 2002, the
range of dates varies from market to market, depending on the IPOs for which we have grey
market prices. In the UK, for instance, we have grey market prices for firms going public
between June 1997 and July 2002. To allow the reader to assess how comprehensive our
sample is, Table 1 reports the number of IPOs in each market during the entire period, as well
14Other than this, we do not have a time series of grey market prices for our sample companies. For an
analysis of a limited sample of daily grey market prices, see Lo¨ﬄer, Panther, and Theissen (2002).
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as during the sub-periods for which we have IPOs with grey market prices for each country.
Over our sample period, Germany and Italy have the most active grey markets, while
London-based brokers frequently make grey markets in IPOs taking place in other countries.
Except in Germany, grey market trading is more common in larger IPOs. Reflecting the fact
that many of our sample IPOs were completed in the late 1990s, the initial return (PAM/PI−1)
averages 36.3%. Bid-ask spreads in the grey market are quite wide, with quoted half spreads
averaging 4.7%. Just over half the IPOs (54.1%) are priced at the high end of the initial
indicative price range. On average, the last grey market price before the issue price is finalized
exceeds the price range midpoint by 40.4%.
5. Empirical results
We now discuss the empirical results in light of our predictions. Since we pool data from
several countries whose grey market and bookbuilding practices likely differ in subtle ways, we
initially estimated all our models with country fixed effects but found these to be insignificant.
Similarly, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we restrict the sample to firms going public
in Germany, which has the most active grey market in our sample. We have also verified that
our results are robust to outliers by winsorizing the price data at the 5% level. To conserve
space, neither of these robustness tests is reported.
5.1. The offer price. Hypothesis 1 discusses the relation between the issue price and the
grey market price. We normalize each by the midpoint of the initial indicative price range,
Pmid, in order to reduce the impact of differences in scale and of heteroskedasticity. The grey
market price that we use is the last reported transaction price before the issue price is set (or
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread when transaction prices are unavailable). This corresponds
to PGM in the model.
It is well-documented that issue prices in Europe are rarely set outside the initial indica-
tive price range; frequently they are set at the endpoints, especially at the top of the range
(see Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003)). Consequently, the observed distribution
of issue prices in our sample is censored at the range endpoints. To correct for this, we
estimate censored regressions (Amemiya (1973)), with censoring both from above and from
below. Censored regressions are similar to Tobit models, except that the point of censoring is
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observation-specific. Note that 54.1% of our observations are right-censored, while 10.5% are
left-censored.
Our model distinguishes between the cases where the grey market price is higher or lower
than the fundamental value. Because fundamental value is unobservable to the econometri-
cian, empirical studies usually take the midpoint of the initial indicative price range as a proxy
for the underwriter’s ex ante prior of the fundamental value. Thus if the grey market price is
above the midpoint it is more likely to be above the fundamentals. To capture the predicted
asymmetry, we interact the grey market price with an indicator function that equals one if
the grey market price exceeds the range midpoint, and zero otherwise.15
Table 2 reports the results. Regression 1 examines the relation between the issue price PI
and the grey market price PGM . Overall, the fit of the model is very good in view of the highly
significant likelihood ratio test. As expected, we find a very significant relation between the
issue price and the grey market price, and an even stronger relation when the grey market
price is above the range midpoint, Pmid. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1: the
grey market price is positively correlated with the issue price. The fact that the correlation
is positive even when the grey market price is low suggests that α > 0: the grey market
price contains information about the fundamental value. The stronger relation for high PGM
reflects an asymmetry in the relation between the grey market price and the issue price. This
is consistent with the asymmetry in the model when αˆ > α, i.e., the underwriter bases the
issue price on the grey market price when it is high, but when the grey market price is low,
the underwriter uses it only to the extent that it contains (partial) information about the
fundamental value. This suggests that not only are grey market investors sentiment investors,
but also the underwriter and the bookbuilding investors are aware that the grey market price
includes a bias. In fact, they include this bias in their valuation only when the bookbuilding
investors can profit from it by selling shares to grey market investors in the aftermarket.
Regression 1 also includes the market index return (measured over the three-month period
prior to the IPO) as a control variable. This variable has previously been associated with
market sentiment (see, for instance, Derrien (2004)). We find a positive and statistically
15The large proportion of right-censored observations is the reason why we introduce the indicator function
to capture the asymmetry rather than splitting the sample between high and low levels of the grey market
price, as we do in later tables. If we were to estimate the censored regression model for the subsample where
the grey market price exceeds the range midpoint, we would have little explanatory power since for most
observations the issue price would equal the top of the range.
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significant coefficient and yet we still find a strong positive and asymmetric relation between
the grey market price and the issue price. This suggests that the grey market price contains
additional information beyond the market-wide returns. This is not surprising, since market
returns surely reflect more than just sentiment and so are at best a noisy proxy for investor
sentiment, especially at the level of individual securities.
In Regression 2 of Table 2 we add the (logarithm of) gross issue proceeds and the bid-ask
spread quoted by grey market brokers shortly before IPO pricing. A wider bid-ask spread may
indicate a lack of depth in the grey market, due to either a scarcity of traders in the grey market
or a diversity of opinion among investors.16 Either way, bookbuilding investors may not be
able to sell all their shares in the aftermarket at the (updated) grey market price PˆGM , causing
the underwriter to price the IPO more conservatively. Similarly, when the issue size is large,
the issue price should reflect the greater difficulty of selling the shares in the aftermarket. In
the model, this is captured by the discount λS and gives rise to Hypothesis 4, which suggests
the issue price should be negatively correlated with the issue size S and positively correlated
with the depth of the market (−λ).
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, in Regression 2 we find negative and statistically significant
relations between the issue price PI and the bid-ask spread, and between PI and log proceeds
S.
In Regression 3 we interact the bid-ask spread with log proceeds, since in the model the
discount λS is the product of the two terms. We find a negative and statistically significant
relation. The relations in Hypothesis 4 refer to the case when PGM is high, since only then do
bookbuilding investors sell their shares to grey market investors. To capture this asymmetry,
Regression 4 includes the product of the bid-ask spread and log proceeds times an indicator
function that equals one when the grey market price is above the range midpoint. Both the
resulting coefficients are negative, but not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, if a wide bid-ask spread also reflects greater divergence of opinion among grey
market investors, it may indicate a less reliable grey market signal (i.e., a smaller α in the
model). Hypothesis 3 predicts that the correlation between the issue price and the grey market
price is weaker when the grey market signal is less reliable. In Regression 5, we attempt to
16An alternative measure of depth is trading volume in the grey market. However, grey market volume data
are not available on a systematic basis.
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capture this by interacting the bid-ask spread with the grey market price. We find that the
coefficient of the interaction term is indeed negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that the positive effect of the grey market price on IPO pricing is attenuated when the bid-ask
spread is wider.
5.2. The short-run aftermarket price. The model suggests that when the grey market price
exceeds the fundamental value, the first-day closing price PAM reflects the price grey market
investors are willing to pay for the shares (i.e., the grey market price adjusted for the infor-
mation learned when the issue price is set). In Table 3, Regression 1, we see that the first-day
closing price is indeed highly correlated with the grey market price, with a coefficient close
to one. The adjusted R2 of 75.4% indicates that we capture a sizable part of the variation in
aftermarket prices using only information available before aftermarket trading begins.
Since Table 2 demonstrates a positive relation between the grey market price PGM and the
issue price PI , it is possible that Regression 1 simply captures the well-documented positive
relation between issue prices and after-market prices (Hanley (1993)): issue prices contain
bookbuilding information and so affect aftermarket prices. To investigate this further, Re-
gression 2 relates the aftermarket price to the issue price. As expected, we find that the
aftermarket price is higher, the higher is PI . The adjusted R
2, however, is much lower than in
Regression 1. In Regression 3, we include both the grey market price and the issue price. The
coefficient estimated for PGM remains highly significant, but PI loses most of its explanatory
power. In sum, high grey market prices predict aftermarket prices independent of the level of
the issue price.17
It is interesting to see how the coefficient of the prior three-month market index return
varies across Regressions 1 through 3. Although the coefficient is both economically and
statistically significant in Regression 2, it loses all its significance when the grey market price
is included in Regressions 1 or 3. This suggests that while market-wide returns may capture
general investor sentiment, as Derrien (2004) argues, they do not capture investor sentiment
about specific IPOs very well – and certainly much less well than PGM .
17Note that while the issue price depends on the grey market price, and the aftermarket price depends on
the issue price and the grey market price, the system described by these two equations is triangular. Thus it
can be consistently estimated recursively, that is, by equation-by-equation estimation. See Greene (2003), p.
383.
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So far, our results might be interpreted as evidence that PGM is a good predictor of the
aftermarket price in general. However, Hypothesis 2 suggests an asymmetry: PGM should
be a better predictor of PAM when PGM is high, since in this case PAM reflects grey market
investors’ (updated) valuation rather than fundamental value. When PGM is low, on the other
hand, PAM equals the expected fundamental value, so the grey market price should only be
related to PAM to the extent that PGM contains information about the fundamental value.
At the same time, we also expect an asymmetry in the effect of the issue price on the
aftermarket price. Specifically, PI should have a relatively stronger effect when PGM is low.
When PGM is high, the bookbuilding information that is incorporated in the issue price affects
the aftermarket price only through the updating of the grey market investors’ valuation. When
PGM is low, the information in the book about the fundamental value is incorporated directly
into the aftermarket price.
In Regressions 4 and 5 we capture the asymmetry by splitting the sample into two subsets
based on whether PGM is above or below the midpoint of the initial indicative price range,
Pmid. We find a stronger relation between the aftermarket price and the grey market price
when PGM exceeds Pmid (coefficient of 0.95) than when it is below Pmid (0.56), consistent with
Hypothesis 2. The fact that the coefficient is larger when PGM is high implies that αˆ > α (i.e.,
grey market investors are biased). The fact that the coefficient is positive and significant even
when PGM is low is consistent with α > 0 (i.e., the grey market price contains fundamental
information). As for the issue price, the coefficient is very similar in the two cases but it is
more statistically significant (at 1%) when PGM is low, as expected.
According to Hypothesis 4, when PGM is high, a wide bid-ask spread or a large issue size
reduces bookbuilding investors’ ability to sell their shares in the aftermarket at the grey market
price. The negative coefficients for these variables in Regression 4 support this prediction,
though only the coefficient of issue size is statistically significant. When the grey market price
is below the range midpoint, on the other hand, neither the bid-ask spread nor log proceeds
have a significant effect on the aftermarket price, as expected (Regression 5).
5.3. Robustness: IPO withdrawals. Until now we have ignored the possibility that IPOs
could be withdrawn after the start of grey market trading. If a combination of negative
sentiment in the grey market and negative information in bookbuilding leads to IPOs being
withdrawn, the remaining observations with a low PGM would tend to have positive book-
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building information. This could potentially bias the results in the direction of the asymmetry
in the relations between PGM and PI , and between PGM and PAM . Since we do not observe PI
and PAM for withdrawn IPOs, the distribution of observed prices has truncated support with
the usual result that regression coefficients may be estimated with bias (Heckman (1979)).
It is an empirical question whether IPOs are withdrawn in response to negative sentiment
in the grey market. Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) investigate a sample of 330 privately-
held German firms that between 1984 and 1995 announced their intention to go public, a
third of which remained private as of December 1999. In their sample, all but one company
withdrew at a very preliminary stage, well before IPO marketing and bookbuilding (and thus
grey market trading) had begun.
To investigate the possible extent of bias for our (later) sample period, we estimate the
frequency with which IPOs are withdrawn after grey market trading has begun in Germany,
the most active grey market in our sample. Between 1997 and 2002, there were 485 completed
IPOs in Germany. Over the same period, a further 236 companies announced their intention
to go public (according to Reuters and VWD, a German news wire service). Of these 236
withdrawn issues, only 20 (8.5%) were withdrawn after grey market trading had begun.18
Thus, as in Boehmer and Ljungqvist’s (2004) sample, the vast majority of IPOs are withdrawn
at a very preliminary stage, and not in response to negative sentiment in the grey market.
Therefore, our results should not be affected.
5.4. Updating. Our data allow us to investigate the extent to which grey market investors
update their valuations upon learning the outcome of bookbuilding. Often, grey market
trading continues for a short time after bookbuilding concludes and the issue price is set
(but before aftermarket trading begins). For a subsample of 262 IPOs, we observe post-
bookbuilding grey market prices, which correspond to PˆGM in the model. To see if grey
market investors incorporate the bookbuilding information revealed through the issue price
PI , we regress PˆGM on PI and PGM (normalizing all three prices by the midpoint of the price
range, Pmid). The estimated equation is:
PˆGM/Pmid = −0.14
(−2.41)
+ 0.23
(2.96)
PI/Pmid + 0.92
(33.82)
PGM/Pmid
18Among these 20 withdrawn IPOs, the last recorded grey market price before withdrawal was, on average,
8.3% below the midpoint of the initial indicative price range. Six of the 20 firms traded above the range
midpoint at the time of withdrawal.
24
where heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are shown in parentheses underneath the
OLS coefficient estimates. The adjusted R2 is 96.9%. The coefficient estimated for PGM is
significantly less than one (p = 0.004), while the coefficient for PI is significantly greater than
zero (p = 0.003). This suggests that grey market investors do adjust their expectations, and
that bookbuilding information is incorporated in PˆGM .
The following alternative specification quantifies the extent to which grey market investors
update upon learning PI :
(PˆGM − PGM)/Pmid = 0.01
(1.21)
+ 0.07
(2.80)
(PI − PGM)/Pmid
The adjusted R2 in this specification is 14.4%. The coefficient estimated for (PI −
PGM)/Pmid suggests that for every dollar difference between PI and PGM , grey market in-
vestors increase their reservation price by seven cents. So although we find that grey market
investors update when they observe the results of bookbuilding, they only update by a rela-
tively small amount, consistent with conservatism.
5.5. Aftermarket trading volume. Table 4 examines the relation between the grey market
price and aftermarket trading volume (as a fraction of the shares sold in the IPO). Hypothesis
5 suggests that the relation should be a step function. When PGM is high, we expect high
turnover because bookbuilding investors sell their shares to the grey market investors whose
valuation exceeds the fundamental value. When PGM is low, bookbuilding investors have no
reason to sell their shares in our model and so trading volume will be lower.
We measure aftermarket trading volume both on the first day and over the first week
following the IPO. To capture the step function, we use an indicator function that equals
one when PGM is above the initial price range midpoint Pmid, and zero otherwise. We find
a positive and statistically significant relation between volume and the indicator function,
both for first-day volume (Regression 1) and first-week volume (Regression 4). This suggests
that when PGM is high, bookbuilding investors are more likely to sell their shares in the
aftermarket, consistent with Hypothesis 5.
A high grey market price could simply indicate that either the IPO or the market is ‘hot,’
which may lead to high volume for reasons outside our model. In Regressions 2 and 5 we
include the market index return (measured over the three-month period before the IPO) to
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capture a ‘hot’ market. In Regressions 3 and 6 we also include the (normalized) first-day
closing market price PAM to capture whether the IPO is ‘hot.’ Even after including these
variables, the coefficient on the indicator function remains positive and significant. This
implies that the positive relation between volume and the indicator function is not simply due
to a high level of trading in ‘hot’ IPOs or in active markets.
5.6. Long-run returns. We now consider how the grey market price and the results of book-
building are related to aftermarket returns in the long run. We test these relations using the
following regression:
PLongRun − PAM
Pmid
−market index return = α+ β1PGM − Pmid
Pmid
+ β2
PAM − PGM
Pmid
+ 
(9)
The dependent variable is the return measured from the end of the first aftermarket trading
day until two, three, six or twelve months later (less the return on the domestic stock market
index). In our model, PLongRun − PAM = (αˆ − α)(sB − sG) + λS when PGM is above the
fundamental value. When PGM is below the fundamental value, PLongRun − PAM = 0. As
before, we normalize all variables by Pmid, the midpoint of the initial indicative price range,
in order to reduce the impact of differences in scale and of heteroskedasticity.19
The independent variables are the difference between the grey market price and the range
midpoint (PGM − Pmid) and the difference between the aftermarket price on the first trading
day and the grey market price (PAM − PGM), both normalized by the range midpoint. To-
gether, these two variables add up to the entire price movement from the prior expected value
of the shares, Pmid, to the price at the end of the first day of aftermarket trading, PAM .
By splitting the price movement in this way, we can relate long-run returns separately
to the two different signals, sG and sB, of our model. PGM − Pmid reflects the information
revealed through grey market trading. Specifically, PGM − Pmid = αˆ(sG −E(sG)) where Pmid
is the ex-ante expected value, E(v). The second variable, PAM − PGM , captures the price
movement that occurs in response to bookbuilding being concluded and the issue price being
set. When the grey market price is high, PAM −PGM = (1− αˆ(sB−E(sB))−λS, representing
19We normalize all variables by the same price, since this allows us to write the coefficients as simple
functions of the model parameters.
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the change in valuation due to the revelation of bookbuilding information (assuming that no
other information arrives in this short interval).
According to Hypothesis 6, long-run returns relate differently to the grey market signal and
the bookbuilding signal. When PGM exceeds the fundamental value, the first-day aftermarket
price will be close to the grey market investors’ reservation price. To the extent that grey
market investors overweight the grey market signal sG (i.e., αˆ > α), their reservation price
diverges from the fundamental value. Therefore, since the price should eventually revert to
the fundamental value, Hypothesis 6 predicts a negative relation between long-run returns
and the difference between the grey market price and the range midpoint. Specifically, the
coefficient β1 in (9) equals − αˆ−ααˆ = ααˆ − 1 which is negative if αˆ > α.
Bookbuilding information, by contrast, is assumed to be about fundamental value. If
so, the difference between the aftermarket price and the grey market price should not be
reversed in the long run, that is, it should not be negatively correlated with long-run returns.
Whether this correlation is zero or positive depends on how grey market investors update
using the bookbuilding information, sB. If they fully update after observing sB (i.e., αˆ = α),
there should be no correlation. If they instead exhibit conservatism (i.e., αˆ > α), then
the movement from the grey market price to the first-day aftermarket price is only a partial
movement towards the fundamental value (assuming PGM is above the fundamental value). As
the market updates further over time, the price continues to move towards the fundamental
value. Thus, when PGM is above the fundamental value and αˆ > α, we expect a positive
correlation between long-run returns and the difference between the aftermarket price and the
grey market price: β2 =
αˆ−α
1−αˆ > 0 in (9).
On the other hand, when PGM is below the fundamental value, PAM already reflects the
expected fundamental value so we expect neither reversal nor continuance in the long run.
In Table 5, we present the results of regression (9) for the full sample as well as a partition
of the sample based on whether PGM is above or below Pmid. The predicted relations should
hold only when the grey market price is high, since only then does the first-day aftermarket
price relate to the grey market investors’ reservation value.
In the full sample, for all horizons, we find a statistically significant negative relation
between PGM − Pmid and long-run returns. However, when we partition the sample, we find
that the negative relation only holds when PGM > Pmid, as predicted by Hypothesis 6. Since
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β1 =
α
αˆ
− 1 when PGM is high, this suggests that αˆ > α: grey market investors overweight
their signal. Thus, non-fundamental information is transmitted from the grey market to
the aftermarket and is reversed in the long run. Moreover, depending on the horizon, the
coefficients range from -0.25 to -0.77 (all significantly greater than -1), indicating that only
part of the price difference between PGM and Pmid is reversed. This can be interpreted as
evidence that PGM contains some information about the fundamental value (i.e., α > 0) and
so does not need to be reversed completely. When PGM < Pmid, we do not find any reversal,
consistent with Hypothesis 6.
Our second variable, PAM −PGM , is not negatively related to long-run returns. As argued
earlier, this is consistent with the hypothesis that the information in the book pertains to the
fundamental value and is not reversed in the long run. The coefficient β2 is positive when the
grey market price is high, consistent with investors updating only gradually over time, but it
is mostly not statistically significant.
6. Allowing bookbuilding investors to trade in the grey market
In Section 2 we assumed that bookbuilding investors are not allowed to trade in the grey
market. In reality, bookbuilding investors are able to participate in the grey market, but the
underwriter actively discourages it (for example, by threatening to exclude them from future
IPOs). Since the underwriter cannot directly observe whether a bookbuilding investor trades
in the grey market, it is unclear how effective a prohibition would be. In this section we
explicitly consider the possibility that bookbuilding investors trade in the grey market, and
show that a bookbuilding investor with a position in the grey market may have additional
incentives not to report his signal truthfully. To avoid this problem, the underwriter might
prohibit the bookbuilding investors from trading in the grey market. If he cannot enforce such
a prohibition, he has to modify the mechanism in a revenue-decreasing way.
To see whether trading in the grey market by bookbuilding investors reduces proceeds, we
start by assuming the underwriter is using the mechanism in Proposition 1 and then look at
whether it affects the incentive compatibility constraints in the maximization problem.
For simplicity, we consider the case in which bookbuilding investors can buy or sell only a
limited number of shares, γ, in the grey market, so that they are price takers. That is, their
trades do not affect the grey market price.
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The details of the argument are given in Appendix 2. Here we sketch the main steps and
give the intuition of the results. We solve the model backward: assuming that a bookbuilding
investor has taken a position (long or short) in the grey market, we look at how his incentive
to truthfully report his signal changes. Then, we look at the investor’s decision to buy or
short-sell shares in the grey market, given that he can anticipate the signal he will report
during bookbuilding.
A bookbuilding investor who observed a signal H and has gone long in the grey market
will always reveal his signal truthfully since this can only have the effect of raising the sale
price in the aftermarket. However, if he has a short position in the grey market he may have
an incentive to lie and report a signal L. If the grey market price is sufficiently high, he will
have an incentive to report a signal L in order to manipulate the price downward and profit
from his initial short position. But if the grey market price is low, the aftermarket price does
not depend on the updated valuation of the grey market investors, so he has no incentive to
misreport his signal. In contrast, a bookbuilding investor who observed a signal L, regardless
of his position in the grey market, will never be induced to lie by a small position in the grey
market.
Given these incentives to a bookbuilding investor who observed H, we look at whether he
prefers to take a long position in the grey market (and truthfully reveal his signal) or whether
he prefers to take a short position (and, when PGM is high, misreport his signal). We find
that the choice depends on the parameter λ.
If there is no lack of depth in the aftermarket (λ = 0), i.e., the bookbuilding investor knows
that there are sufficient investors to whom he can sell shares at PˆGM in the aftermarket, then
an investor who has observed a signal H will find it more profitable to buy shares than to
short sell them in the grey market. In such case, the investor will truthfully report his signal,
so the underwriter need not be concerned if bookbuilding investors trade in the grey market.
The only situation in which trading in the grey market by bookbuilding investors could
hurt the issuer arises when λ > 0, i.e., there is insufficient depth in the aftermarket. In this
case, for sufficiently high PGM , bookbuilding investors take advantage of the discount in the
aftermarket (λS) by short selling in the grey market and covering this position at a lower
price.
Therefore, although the existence of the grey market is beneficial for the issuer in that it
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increases the expected IPO proceeds (as shown in Section 2), participation by bookbuilding
investors in the grey market may not be. This result rationalizes investment bankers’ efforts
to discourage bookbuilding investors from participating in the grey market, particularly when
PGM is high. But the underwriter should only be concerned about bookbuilding investors
participating in the grey market when they short sell and the aftermarket is expected to be
thin.
7. Conclusion
We have taken advantage of the existence of a grey market for shares of companies about to
go public to test whether behavioral biases among small investors can explain the well-known
anomalies in post-IPO prices. When small investors are excessively optimistic, they are willing
to pay a price above the fundamental value, resulting in a high aftermarket price. When they
are pessimistic, and value the shares below the fundamental value, they will be priced out of
the market, in which case we predict no bias in the aftermarket price. This argument implies
an asymmetric relation between the grey market price and the aftermarket price.
Using grey market price data for a large set of European IPOs, we find evidence of such
an asymmetric relation. Moreover, when the grey market price is high, we find that long-run
returns are negatively correlated with the grey market price, while this pattern does not arise
when the grey market price is low. This suggests that when small investors drive the price
upward in the short-run aftermarket, there is a reversal as the price converges towards the
fundamental value in the long run.
The combination of the asymmetric effect of the grey market price and the long-run reversal
provides evidence on the existence of sentiment investors. Moreover, the fact that when these
sentiment investors are pessimistic about an issue their opinion has less of an effect on the
aftermarket and issue prices, suggests that the underwriter and sophisticated investors can
identify sentiment investors. Thus, they consider the opinion of sentiment investors biased,
and they take it into account only when they can profit from it, by selling shares to them in
the aftermarket.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. We focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e., informed investors are treated symmetrically.
For a given sG define Ps˜B ≡ PI(sG, s˜B) as the issue price set when the aggregate information
revealed through bookbuilding is s˜B. The underwriter chooses the mechanism that maximizes
expected proceeds:
max
Ps˜B ,q
S
[
pi2PH + 2pi(1− pi)PM + (1− pi)2PL
]
(10)
subject to the individual rationality constraints
VsB(sB) ≥ Ps˜B , (11)
the incentive compatibility constraint for informed investor i who observes a signal si = H,
pi S−qu(H,H)
2
[VH(H)− PH ] + (1− pi) [S − qu(H,L)− q(L,H)] [VM(M)− PM ]
≥ piq(L,H) [VH(M)− PM ] + (1− pi)S−qu(L,L)2 [VM(L)− PL] (12)
and the incentive compatibility constraint for informed investor i who observes a signal si = L,
piq(L,H) [VM(M)− PM ] + (1− pi)S−qu(L,L)2 [VL(L)− PL]
≥ pi S−qu(H,H)
2
[VM(H)− PH ] + (1− pi) [S − qu(H,L)− q(L,H)] [VL(M)− PM ]
(13)
where the quantities are written so that the sum of the shares allocated to the two informed
investors and the uninformed investor equals S.
We proceed as follows: we first ignore the second incentive compatibility constraint (13)
and find the optimal solution. We then check that this constraint is in fact non-binding at
the optimum.
Step 2. Since the number of shares sold always equals S and the underwriter charges all
investors the same issue price, the quantity allocated to each investor does not directly affect
proceeds. Thus, we choose the quantities to relax the incentive compatibility constraint (12)
as much as possible since a slacker constraint will allow an optimum with a higher price.
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This is achieved by setting qu(H,H) = qu(H,L) = 0; qu(L,L) = S(1 − k); q(H,H) =
S/2; q(H,L) = S; q(L,H) = 0; and q(L,L) = Sk/2. Substituting and dividing both sides by
S, the incentive compatibility constraint for type H (equation (12)) becomes
pi
2
[VH(H)− PH ] + (1− pi) [VM(M)− PM ] ≥ (1− pi)k
2
[VM(L)− PL] (14)
When this incentive compatibility constraint is binding, we can write it as
PH = VH(H) +
2(1− pi)
pi
[VM(M)− PM ]− 1− pi
pi
k [VM(L)− PL] (15)
If we substitute constraint (15) into the objective function, we obtain
max
Pi
S
[
pi2VH(H) + 2pi(1− pi)VM(M)− pi(1− pi)kVM(L) + pi(1− pi)kPL + (1− pi)2PL
]
(16)
subject to the individual rationality constraint (11).
The maximization function is increasing in PL, so it is optimal to set PL as high as possible
subject to the individual rationality constraint, i.e., PL = VL(L). The choice of PH and PM is
indeterminate, so we consider the example when PM = VM(M). The incentive compatibility
constraint thus implies PH = VH(H)− 1−pipi k [VM(L)− VL(L)] .
Step 3. Since we derived the optimal mechanism ignoring constraint (13), we have to check
that this constraint is not violated at the optimum. First, note that if we substitute in (13)
the optimal quantities q and qu and issue price PI , the constraint can be rewritten as:
k [VM(L)− VL(L)] ≤ pi
1− pi [VH(H)− VM(H)] + 2 [VM(M)− VL(M)] (17)
where all terms in brackets are non-negative. From the assumption of equidistance k < pi
1−pi =
1 it is enough to show that [VH(H)− VM(H)] ≥ [VM(L)− VL(L)] for the constraint to be
satisfied.
To check whether this constraint is satisfied, we have to substitute the values of the func-
tions VsB(·). Depending on the value of PGM these functions take different values. In the next
step we determine the different values of these functions for different ranges of PGM . We can
then proceed to check that constraint (17) is satisfied for all these areas.
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Step 4. The value of VsB(·) depends on whether it is equal to the fundamental or the sale
value. We first determine when VsB(·) is equal to the fundamental value.
For any sB and s˜B, VsB(s˜B) = αsG + (1− α)sB (the fundamental value) if and only if
PGM ≤ (1− αˆ)M + αˆ
αˆ− α [(1− α)sB − (1− αˆ)s˜B + λS] ≡ B(sB, s˜B) (18)
Proof: Since PGM = EG(v | sG) = αˆsG + (1− αˆ)E(sB) we can derive that sG = 1αˆ [PGM −
(1− αˆ)M ]. From the definition of VsB(s˜B) in (8), VsB(s˜B) = αsG + (1− α)sB if and only if
αsG + (1− α)sB ≥ αˆsG + (1− αˆ)s˜B − λS
Substituting for sG and rearranging the terms gives (18).
Step 5. Let us distinguish three different areas:
1) PGM ≤ B(M,H).
2) PGM > B(M,L).
3) B(M,H) ≤ PGM < B(M,L).
where B(M,H) < B(M,L) since, from (18), B(sB, s˜B) decreases in s˜B.
In the first area, from equation (18), VM(L) = VM(H) = FM and VH(H) = FH , where
FsB ≡ αsG + (1 − α)sB (i.e., the fundamental value). Thus the constraint is satisfied if
(FM − VL(L)) ≤ (FH − FM). Since VL(L) ≥ FL it is sufficient to show that (FM − FL) ≤
(FH − FM). Substituting for FsB we obtain
(1− α)(M − L) ≤ (1− α)(H −M)
Since M − L = H −M, it is satisfied with an equality.
In the second area, VM(L) = VL(L) = PˆGM(L) − λS. Thus the left-hand side equals 0.
Since the right-hand side is always non-negative, the constraint is satisfied.
In the third area, VM(L) = FM , VH(H) = FH , VL(L) = PˆGM(L) − λS and VM(H) =
PˆGM(H)− λS. Thus the constraint is satisfied if
[FM − PˆGM(L) + λS] ≤ [FH − PˆGM(H) + λS].
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Substituting for FM , PˆGM(L), and PˆGM(H), and using the assumption αˆ ≥ 1+α2 , the constraint
is satisfied.
The optimal mechanism as a function of the grey market price
The expressions in Proposition 1 are written in terms of the functions VsB(s˜B), which depend
on PGM . Therefore the mechanism looks different over different ranges of PGM . To see how
the mechanism looks for different ranges of values of PGM it is enough to substitute the actual
values of the functions VsB(s˜B).
Since for a given PGM we can always compute both the fundamental value and the sale
value using equations (4) and (5), we can redefine the fundamental value and the sale value
as functions of PGM . The fundamental value is defined as FsB(PGM) ≡ E(v | sG, sB) and the
sale value is defined as PˆGM(PGM , s˜B)− λS ≡ PˆGM(sG, s˜B)− λS.
We distinguish five different intervals of PGM . The boundaries of these intervals are the
values v¯ > v1 > v2 > v3 > v4 > 0, where
• v1 is defined so that PˆGM(v1, H)−λS = FH(v1). In other words, if the grey market price
is PGM = v1, and the bookbuilding information is H, the fundamental value exactly
equals the sale value of the shares;
• v2 is defined so that PˆGM(v2, L)− λS = FM(v2);
• v3 is defined so that PˆGM(v3,M)− λS = FM(v3); and
• v4 is defined so that PˆGM(v4, L)− λS = FL(v4).
The issue price in each interval is as follows:
1. If PGM ∈ [v1, v¯] then

if s˜B = H, PI = PˆGM(PGM , H)− λS,
if s˜B = M , PI = PˆGM(PGM ,M)− λS,
if s˜B = L, PI = PˆGM(PGM , L)− λS.
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2. If PGM ∈ [v2, v1] then

if s˜B = H, PI = FH(PGM),
if s˜B = M , PI = PˆGM(PGM ,M)− λS,
if s˜B = L, PI = PˆGM(PGM , L)− λS.
3. If PGM ∈ [v3, v2] then

if s˜B = H, PI = FH(PGM)− 1−pipi k[FM(PGM)− PˆGM(PGM , L) + λS],
if s˜B = M , PI = PˆGM(PGM ,M)− λS,
if s˜B = L, PI = PˆGM(PGM , L)− λS.
4. If PGM ∈ [v4, v3] then

if s˜B = H, PI = FH(PGM)− 1−pipi k[FM(PGM)− PˆGM(PGM , L) + λS],
if s˜B = M , PI = FM(PGM),
if s˜B = L, PI = PˆGM(PGM , L)− λS.
5. If PGM ∈ [0, v4] then

if s˜B = H, PI = FH(PGM)− 1−pipi k[FM(PGM)− FL(PGM)],
if s˜B = M , PI = FM(PGM),
if s˜B = L, PI = FL(PGM).
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Appendix 2: Allowing bookbuilding investors to trade in the grey market
In this Appendix we show when trading by bookbuilding investors in the grey market can
affect the optimal mechanism and reduce expected IPO proceeds.
We proceed as follows. We assume that the underwriter is using the mechanism of Propo-
sition 1 and check whether the incentive compatibility constraints are still satisfied.
We solve the model backward: assuming that a bookbuilding investor has taken a position
in the grey market, we look at how his incentive to truthfully report his signal changes. Then,
we look at the investor’s decision to buy or short-sell shares in the grey market, given that he
can anticipate the signal he will report during bookbuilding.
Consider an informed investor who has observed a signal si = H. We only need to look
at the incentive compatibility constraint of this investor, since we showed in Appendix 1 that
only this constraint is binding at the optimum.
If an investor who has observed a signal si = H has no position at all in the grey market,
his incentive compatibility constraint would be as in (13). However, if he has a position in
the grey market, the incentive compatibility constraint would change.
If the investor has bought γ shares in the grey market, the constraint becomes
pi S
2
[VH(H)− PH ] + (1− pi)S [VM(M)− PM ] + γ [piVH(H) + (1− pi)VM(M)− PGM ]
≥ (1− pi)Sk
2
[VM(L)− PL] + γ [piVH(M) + (1− pi)VM(L)− PGM ]
(19)
The last term on the left-hand side represents the expected profit from buying γ shares in the
grey market if he truthfully declares H. The last term on the right-hand side represents the
expected profit from the grey market position if he falsely declares L.
Since the incentive compatibility constraint (13) was satisfied with equality in the mecha-
nism of Proposition 1, constraint (19) is satisfied if and only if
γ [piVH(H) + (1− pi)VM(M)− PGM ] ≥ γ [piVH(M) + (1− pi)VM(L)− PGM ] .
Since VH(H) ≥ VH(M) and VM(M) ≥ VM(L) the inequality is always satisfied. Thus, an
investor who observed a signal H and bought γ shares in the grey market will still tell the
truth and declare H.
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If instead the bookbuilding investor has a short position of γ shares in the grey market,
his incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied if and only if
γ [PGM − piVH(H)− (1− pi)VM(M)] ≥ γ [PGM − piVH(M)− (1− pi)VM(L)] ,
where the left-hand side is the expected profit from the short position if he truthfully announces
his signalH, and the right-hand side is the profit if he misreports his signal as L. In both cases,
the profits are given by the difference between the grey market price and the expected value
to the investor of the shares he must deliver to cover the position. Since VH(H) ≥ VH(M) and
VM(M) ≥ VM(L) this inequality is always weakly violated. If PGM ≤ FM +λS (corresponding
to PGM ≤ v3, where v3 is defined in Section 2.4), it is satisfied with equality, so the investor
does not lie. However, if PGM > FM + λS the inequality is violated and he misreports his
signal.
To summarize, when a bookbuilding investor with signal H is long in the grey market,
he will have greater incentive to truthfully reveal his signal in order to raise the aftermarket
price. If he is short in the grey market and the grey market price is sufficiently high, he will
have an incentive to report a signal L in order to manipulate the price downward.
We now look at whether this bookbuilding investor prefers to take a long position in the
grey market (and truthfully reveal his signal) or whether he prefers to take a short position
(and misreport his signal when PGM > FM+λS). Since the original constraint (13) is satisfied
with equality, we only have to compare the additional profits from the respective grey market
positions. The investor will prefer to buy shares in the grey market (and report truthfully) if
and only if
γ [piVH(H) + (1− pi)VM(M)− PGM ] ≥ γ [PGM − piVH(M)− (1− pi)VM(L)] (20)
In order to see when this inequality is satisfied, start by considering the special case of
λ = 0. By substituting for the functions VsB(s˜B) one can verify that the inequality is always
satisfied. Thus, an investor who has observed a signal H will buy shares in the grey market
and declare the truth.
However, when λ > 0 the inequality may be violated. In particular, when PGM is very
high (i.e. PGM ≥ FH+λS), any λ > 0 results in a violation of the inequality. For intermediate
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values of PGM (FM + λS < PGM < FH + λS), the inequality will be violated for sufficiently
large λ. For lower levels of PGM (PGM < FM +λS) the inequality is irrelevant since, as shown
above, even with a short position the investor has no incentive to misreport his signal.
Thus, when PGM is high and λ > 0, allowing bookbuilding investors to trade in the grey
market results in lower IPO proceeds.
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Figure 1. The issue price in the optimal mechanism. The
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of IPOs with Available Grey Market Prices  
 
We have grey market prices for 486 (mostly European) IPOs completed between November 1995 and December 2002. Sample companies are incorporated in the 
following 20 countries: Austria (13), Belgium (1), Canada (1), Denmark (1), Finland (3), France (13), Germany (321), Greece (2), Ireland (2), Israel (7), Italy 
(61), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (11), Norway (2), Spain (5), Sweden (2), Switzerland (11), the United Kingdom (24), and United States (4). 
Note that there is no grey market in the U.S.; the four American companies are in the sample because they go public in Europe. Most companies go public in 
their home country, but some do not. Where a company goes public on more than one exchange, we take the listing country to be its home country or (if it 
doesn’t list on a home-country exchange) the country in which most of the shares are placed. The table shows descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole as 
well as broken down by the twelve countries on whose exchanges sample companies list. We also show, for each listing country, the first and last date for which 
we have an IPO with grey market prices. This sample window varies from country to country. The sample for which we have grey market prices is a subsample 
of the 2,723 IPOs completed in the twelve listing countries shown between November 1995 and December 2002. Gross proceeds are shares sold (including the 
overallotment option if exercised) times the issue price, converted into U.S. dollars using exchange rates on the first trading day. Initial returns are computed 
using the closing price on the first trading day. Quoted half spread refers to the quoted bid-ask spread in the grey market, just before the IPO issue price is set. It 
is computed as half the difference between the bid and the ask divided by the midpoint of the spread.  
 
 Sample window  No. of IPOs…  Gross proceeds ($m)  Initial return (%)   Fraction  
Grey market 
price rel. to
  first date last date 
w/ grey 
market 
prices
during 
sample 
window
in Nov 
‘95-Dec 
2002 mean median   mean st.dev.
Quoted 
half spread 
(%), mean
priced at 
high end 
of range
midpoint of 
price range, 
mean (%)
       
Total Nov 1995 Dec 2002
 
 486 1,755
 
2,723
 
 343.7 53.0  36.3 65.6  4.7 
 
 54.1 
 
 40.4 
              
      
2 18 25
3 22 58
  
  2 23 80    
1 1 56
2 5 107
5 12 38
2 22 96
 8 59 67
                 
By country of listing             
Austria Nov 1997 Nov 2000   654.5 654.5  -2.5 6.6  6.9  0.0  5.1 
Finland Nov 1998 Dec 1999   686.7 531.0  74.6 91.9  1.6  33.3  53.0 
France Oct 1997  Dec 2001  14 409 544  1715.3 650.0  6.5 12.9  4.2  42.9  24.6 
Germany Nov 1995 Jul 2002  363 489 504  169.9 42.2  41.5 67.8  5.1  63.4  46.6 
Greece Oct 2000  Dec 2001  1  423.4 423.4  -4.6 0.6 0.0  -7.3 
Italy Nov 1995 Dec 2002  61 132 133  599.0 106.1  20.2 63.4  4.3  27.9  13.1 
Netherlands Mar 2000 Mar 2000   2829.0 2829.0  0.5                 100.0  117.9 
Norway Mar 2000 May 2000   139.7 139.7  29.5 44.5  0.6  0.0  85.7 
Spain Jun 1999 May 2001   1374.0 915.7  10.5 13.2  5.1  20.0  11.8 
Sweden Jun 2000 Jun 2001  1  4405.4 4405.4  9.9 8.2  0.9  50.0  19.2 
Switzerland Dec 1996 Dec 2001   1097.4 153.8  50.1 99.8  1.7  12.5  36.0 
United Kingdom 
 
Jun 1997 Jul 2002  23 563 815  566.8 265.3  21.5 35.0  1.5 
 
 21.7  32.9 
 
Table 2:  Determinants of the Issue Price 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is the IPO issue price PI normalized by the midpoint of the 
initial price range Pmid. The explanatory variables are the last grey market price before the issue price was 
set PGM (also normalized by the midpoint of the initial price range), the last bid-ask spread in the grey 
market (divided by its midpoint), and the logarithm of the IPO proceeds. We also include the domestic 
market index return over the three-month period before the IPO as a control variable. To capture the 
predicted asymmetry, we define an indicator function set to one when PGM is above Pmid. Grey market 
prices are available for 486 IPOs. Nine of these are fixed-price offerings, so we lack information on their 
initial price ranges. This reduces the number of observations in model (1) to 477. Models (2) through (5) 
include the bid-ask spread, which is available for 442 IPOs. We use censored regressions because European 
IPOs are rarely priced outside the initial price range. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Three, two, and 
one asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Intercepts are not shown. 
 
 Dependent variable: Normalized Issue Price (PI / Pmid) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   
PGM / Pmid 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.37*** 
 (6.01) (5.60) (5.70) (5.49) (6.34) 
      
PGM / Pmid 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 
x Indicator(PGM  > Pmid) (7.29) (6.43) (6.44) (5.50) (6.24) 
      
Market index return 0.20** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
 (2.39) (2.72) (2.87) (2.88) (2.72) 
      
Grey market bid-ask spread  -0.36***    
  (-3.24)    
      
Grey market bid-ask spread     -0.37*** 
x PGM / Pmid     (-3.57) 
      
Log gross proceeds  -0.01*   -0.01* 
  (-1.83)   (-1.91) 
      
Grey market bid-ask spread   -0.08*** -0.05  
x Log gross proceeds   (-3.13) (-1.23)  
      
Grey market bid-ask spread     -0.06  
x Log gross proceeds  
x Indicator(PGM  > Pmid)    
(-1.15) 
 
      
      
LR test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2) 488.9*** 454.3*** 453.2*** 454.5*** 456.6*** 
No. of observations    477 442 442 442 442 
No. of left-censored observations 51 50 50 50 50 
No. of right-censored observations 263 246 246 246 246 
      
Table 3: Determinants of the First-Day Aftermarket Price 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is the stock price at the end of the first day of aftermarket 
trading (normalized by the midpoint of the range) adjusted for the market index return from the pricing date 
to the end of the first day of aftermarket trading: PAM / Pmid – (1 + market index return). The explanatory 
variables are the normalized last grey market price before the issue price was set PGM / Pmid, the normalized 
issue price PI / Pmid, the last bid-ask spread in the grey market (divided by its midpoint), and the logarithm 
of the IPO proceeds. We also include the domestic market index return over the three-month period before 
the IPO as a control variable. White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Three, two, and one asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Intercepts 
are not shown. 
 
 Full sample PGM  > Pmid PGM  ≤ Pmid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
PGM / Pmid 0.98***  0.95*** 0.95*** 0.56*** 
 (14.87)  (13.14) (12.59) (3.62) 
      
PI / Pmid  2.60*** 0.44** 0.51* 0.53*** 
  (11.50) (2.46) (1.66) (3.12) 
      
Market index return 0.05 2.12*** -0.01 0.03 -0.15* 
 (0.23) (5.10) (-0.07) (0.11) (-1.78) 
      
Grey market bid-ask spread -0.62 0.41 -0.46 -0.73 -0.06 
 (-1.52) (0.80) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-0.49) 
      
Log gross proceeds -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01 
 (-3.06) (-3.00) (-3.12) (-3.02) (-1.50) 
      
      
Adjusted R2 75.4 % 27.5 % 75.7 % 70.7 % 68.4 %  
F-test: all coeff. = 0 77.6*** 52.7*** 164.5*** 64.4*** 55.2*** 
No. of observations 442 442 442 330 112 
Table 4: Aftermarket Volume 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural logarithm of first-day volume (as a percentage of 
the shares sold in the IPO), measured over the first day and first week of aftermarket trading. The main 
explanatory variable is an indicator function set to one when the last grey market price before the issue 
price was set (PGM) exceeded the midpoint of the initial price range (Pmid). The controls in models (2)-(3) 
and (5)-(6) are the domestic market index return over the three-month period before the IPO and the 
normalized first-day after-market price (PAM / Pmid). White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are 
given in parentheses. Three and two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Intercepts are not shown. 
 
 Log first-day volume  Log first-week volume 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Indicator(PGM  > Pmid) 1.08*** 0.89*** 0.70*** 1.00*** 0.84*** 0.65*** 
 (7.64) (6.15) (4.59) (8.72) (7.25) (5.25) 
       
Market returns  2.84*** 2.12*  2.47*** 1.74** 
  (4.48) (3.20)  (4.69) (3.19) 
       
PAM / Pmid   0.33***   0.33*** 
   (4.70)   (5.34) 
       
       
Adjusted R2 12.0 % 15.7% 18.0% 14.2 % 18.0% 21.3% 
F-test: all coeff. = 0 58.3*** 40.7*** 44.3*** 76.1*** 48.7*** 50.9*** 
No. of observations 443 443 443  443 443 443 
        
Table 5. Long-Run Returns 
 
The dependent variables are market-adjusted long-run returns measured from the first day of aftermarket trading, defined as (RLR – Rmkt)(PAM /Pmid) where RLR is 
the long-run return over the first two, three, six or 12 months of aftermarket trade, Rmkt is the contemporaneous return on the domestic market index, and the 
multiplier (PAM /Pmid) is used to ensure that the dependent variables are consistent with the normalization of the independent variables. White heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses. Three and two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Intercepts are not shown. 
 
  Full sample PGM  > Pmid PGM  ≤ Pmid 
Horizon: 42 days 63 days 126 days 252 days 42 days 63 days 126 days 252 days 42 days 63 days 126 days 252 days
 (1)          
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 
(10) (11) (12)
 
(PGM – Pmid)/Pmid  -0.20*** -0.19**     
          
            
         
          
             
             
          
      
           
-0.39*** -0.65*** -0.26*** -0.25** -0.48*** -0.77*** 0.42 1.00 1.86** 0.98** 
 (-3.43) (-2.12) (-3.51) (7.38) (-3.68) (-2.36) (-3.67) (-7.05) (1.48) (1.97) (2.14) (1.98)
 
(PAM – PGM)/Pmid  0.12 0.66** 0.67 -0.01 0.09 0.63** 0.64 -0.03 1.23 2.20 1.33 -0.80
 (1.01) (2.32) (1.37) (-0.02) (0.76) (2.12) (1.26) (-0.10) (1.29) (1.60) (0.91) (-1.00)
Adjusted R2 2.5% 6.0% 5.2% 4.8 3.2% 6.6% 6.3% 5.5% 5.9 % 
 
8.1 % 2.4 % 0.7 % 
F-test: all coeff. = 0 8.5*** 10.8*** 18.8*** 43.7*** 9.1*** 11.6*** 20.6*** 39.0*** 
 
1.2 2.0 2.3 3.0
No. of observations 477 477 477 477 358 358 358 358 119 119 119 119
 
 
